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Through the years medical practitioners have been involved
in far more malpractice cases than dentists. However, in recent
years the number of malpractice cases which have been brought
against dentists has increased.
Because of the onerous connotations of the word "malprac-
tice," an attempt has been made to drop the term and to substitute
in its place the phrase "professional liability." This effort has met
with little success. Whatever the wrong is called the result is the
same-more frequent and larger verdicts in favor of the patient
against the dentist.
In this day and age, it is no more wrong for a patient who has
been injured by the negligent or willful act of a dentist to recover
damages from the dentist for his pain and suffering than it is for a
dentist to seek recovery from a patient for his fee or to recover from
a negligent auto driver for damage which the driver caused to the
dentist. Professional liability or malpractice cases involving den-
tists as well as physicians will not only continue but will increase
in frequency until some form of recovery is provided to the injured
patient without the necessity of litigation. Perhaps some form of
no-fault insurance could be provided to protect both the patient
and the dentist.
Dentistry is, and probably will always be, considered a portion
of the medical practice in the eyes of the courts. This is especially
true with respect to the applicable law in professional liability
cases.' Dentists are governed by the same legal rules applicable to
physicians and surgeons with respect to the exercise of due care
and skill.' One who holds himself out as a specialist in a particular
branch of dentistry is legally expected to possess and to exercise
that degree of skill and care which is possessed and is exercised by
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similar specialists acting under similar circumstances and not
merely the average skill and care of a general practitioner.'
The law is clear that a practitioner of any of the medical arts
may be guilty of professional irresponsibility and, therefore, may
be called upon to pay damages if he acts without possessing the
requisite skill' or fails to exercise the expected skill in making his
diagnosis or treating his patient.5 Dentists have been named defen-
dants in a number of actions on the theory of negligent failure to
use all proper diagnostic aids prior to undertaking treatment of the
patient. In O'Brien v. Stover,6 a damage award was sustained
against a dentist because of his negligence in failing to take a tissue
biopsy of the patient. This procedure probably would have re-
vealed the presence of a tissue cancer which was the ultimate cause
of the patient's death. Similarly, in a case against a physician,7 the
jury awarded a woman $300,000 because it found the physician
negligent in failing to timely take a biopsy which would have dis-
closed breast cancer in the patient. The failure of a dentist to make
use of X-rays both before and after an operation may amount to
negligence on the part of the dentist.
In the absence of an express contractual arrangement between
the dentist and patient, the dentist does not warrant or guarantee
to cure the patient or to render totally satisfactory services.8 How-
ever, if the dentist does guarantee success in his treatment or pro-
cedure and fails to live up to his guaranty, he will be liable in
damages to the patient for breach of contract. But he will not be
liable on this theory for any pain and suffering the patient may
endure as a result of the breach. For example, in Carpenter v.
Moore,9 the issue was raised as to "what should be the recovery in
an action by a patient against a dentist for breach of a contract to
'O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971); Hopkins v. Heller, 59 Cal.
App. 447, 210 P. 975 (1922); Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 150 A. 516 (1930);
Barnes v. Bouenmyer, 255 Iowa 220, 122 N.W.2d 312 (1963); Eatley v. Mayer, 10
N.J. Misc. 219, 158 A. 516 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
'See Mitchell v. Adkins, 36 Del. 451, 178 A. 593 (1935); Morse v. Rapkin, 24
App. Div. 2d 24, 263 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1965).
5Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 260 A.2d 825 (1970).
e443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971).
7Heilbrun v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., No. 627860 (San Francisco City Super.
Ct. Oct. 1971).
8McTyeire v. McGaughy, 222 Ala. 100, 130 So. 784 (1930); Giering v. Lemoine,
106 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 1958); Viland v. Winslow, 34 Mich. App. 486, 191 N.W.2d
735 (1971); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Colvin v.
Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949).
'51 Wash. 2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958). See W. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 31.
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make upper and lower plates to the patient's complete satisfac-
tion." The court correctly held that the amount of compensation
paid to the dentist for his services was the limit of the patient's
recovery and the patient was not entitled to recover for pain and
suffering.
Problems relating to obtaining the patient's consent to a pro-
cedure are becoming increasingly important. Judge Cardozo said:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages."' 0 One who under-
takes to treat a patient without the patient's consent, implied or
expressed, or extends the operation beyond that to which the pa-
tient has consented is guilty of a technical battery.
The California court has held that an integral part of the
physician's overall obligation to the patient is the duty of reason-
able disclosure to the patient of available choices with respect to
the proposed therapy, and of the dangers inherently and potenti-
ally involved in each. There is no consent if the patient is not
knowledgeable with respect to these matters. The dentist treat-
ing a patient who does not have sufficient knowledge is guilty of
committing a battery." The application of this principle is well
illustrated in Watkins v. Parpala.'2 The plaintiff alleged that a
serious infection in her sinus had been caused by the forcing of a
substance called "Jelrate" into the sinus through a root canal
while the dentist was making an impression for dentures. The
patient argued with success that the dentist had not informed
her of the possibility of the development of a fistula at the root
canal through which foreign material might be ingested into the
sinus, and that he had, in consequence of that neglect, proceeded
with the treatment without her consent.
It seems clear that each patient is entitled to the opportunity
to weigh the risks of treatment, except when it is evident that he
cannot evaluate the data, as for example where there is an emer-
gency or the patient is a child or incompetent. To cover these
situations the law provides that consent is implied in emergency
situations. If the patient is a minor or incompetent, the authority
'"Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
"Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
222 Wash. App. 484, 469 P.2d 974 (1970).
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to consent is transferred to the patient's legal guardian or closest
available relative.
The issue of insurance coverage when a dentist is the defen-
dant in an action based on assault and battery should not be
overlooked. In one case'3 in which malpractice insurance was in-
volved, the court noted that counsel for the insurance company
had made a remarkable concession when he admitted that the
word "malpractice" had been almost universally construed by the
courts to include an operation performed without the consent of
the patient. Except for this admission, it is difficult to think that
the court would have held the insurance company liable on its
policy. If a fire insurance policy does not cover loss caused by the
insured's arson, why should a malpractice insurance policy cover
a dentist from loss for intentional wrongs as distinguished from
negligent wrongs?
The law requires that every professional man exercise that
degree of skill and care which the law imposes upon him. A failure
to meet this standard which causes injury to the patient gives the
patient a cause of action against the wrongdoer. The law presumes,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that, in a given case,
the dentist did in fact perform his services with care and skill. 4
The law does not presume negligence simply because the results
anticipated did not in fact occur from the treatment.'5
In some jurisdictions the locality rule is still in effect. This is
a rule of law which states that a dentist or physician is to be held
to the obligation to exercise the degree of care and skill possessed
and exercised by other practitioners in the same locality.'" The
locality rule is losing popularity, as well it should.'7 In fact, it has
been modified in West Virginia. 8 The rule has two practical diffi-
culties: First, the scarcity of professional men ;n the community
who are qualified and willing to testify about the local standards
"Shehee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 122 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1954).
"Wilson v. Kornegay, 108 Ga. App. 318, 132 S.E. 791 (1930); Angulo v. Hallar,
137 Md. 227, 112 A. 179 (1920); Devereaux v. Smith, 213 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948).
"Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934); Blodgett v. Nevius, 189
Ill. App. 544 (1914); Negaard v. Feda, 152 Mont. 47, 446 P.2d 436 (1968); Inglis v.
Morton, 99 Wash. 570, 169 P. 962 (1918). See 18 NACCA L.J. 352 (1956).
"Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Hamilton v. Kelsey, 126
Ore. 26, 268 P. 750 (1928); Hill v. Parker, 12 Wash. 2d 517, 122 P.2d 476 (1942).
"Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
"Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
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of care; second, the possibility of a small group who, by their
laxness and carelessness, could establish a local standard of care
below that which the law should require.'9 The locality rule is not,
and has not been used in England.20 There, the same care is ex-
pected and required throughout the country; that is, the known
rule and usage of the profession at large.
The courts are concerned not only with the area in which the
dentist practices, but also with the state of professional knowledge
at the time of the treatment. A dentist, physician, or surgeon holds
himself out to possess the degree of learning and skill that is pos-
sessed by the profession at the time, and not as it may have existed
in the past.2'
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine was first applied in a dental
malpractice case in Keily v. Colton,2  decided in 1882. That case
involved the extraction of a tooth. The extracted tooth was permit-
ted to fall into the bronchial tube while the patient was under
anesthetic. The court held thiat the evidence of the occurrence was
sufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence for the jury.
Professor William R. Arthur wrote, in an article entitled Res Ipsa
Loquitur as Applied in Dental Cases:2 "The application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine relieves the plaintiff of the troublesome duty
of providing expert witnesses. To secure the aid of the doctrine, the
plaintiff must establish his injury and the background of facts,
which, if unexplained, make the inference of negligence permissi-
ble." Unless the facts can be established by the testimony of non-
expert witnesses, the rule cannot be applied. Consequently, in all
cases in which care and skill are involved, expert testimony is
required to establish the requisite skill and whether that skill was
exercised. These cases include, for example, jaw fractures in ex-
traction cases. If a layman cannot look at the circumstances in the
case and say that the accident would not have occurred in the
ordinary course of dentistry but for someone's negligence, the doc-
trine cannot be applied. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine normally is
not applied in cases involving anesthesia, broken needles, wrongful
death, or cases involving the use of X-rays.2
"Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
"Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767).
"McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898); Cox v. Cartwright,
96 Ohio App. 245, 121 N.E.2d 673 (1953).
"l City Ct. Rep. 439 (N.Y. Marine Ct. 1882).
1115 ROCKY MT. L. Rnv. 220 (1942).
'lId. at 224.
2See W. MoRRis, DENTAL LrrIGATION, supra note 1, at ch. 8, for consideration
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Mere bad results are not evidence of negligence. 21 Courts have
generally refused to infer negligence on the part of a dentist simply
because the patient suffered a cut. Without the aid of the res ipsa
loquitur presumption, negligence on the part of the dentist nor-
mally must be proven by testimony from an expert rather than a
lay person.27 Whether or not the negligent treatment or lack of
treatment by the defendant accelerated or contributed to the
death of the plaintiff's decedent has to be established by expert
testimony, inasmuch as such knowledge is not in the domain of the
jury.,
A dentist owes the same duty of care and skill to a patient
during post-operative treatment as during the operation itself un-
less the terms of the employment otherwise limit the duty or the
pAtient refuses to permit the dentist to continue with the treat-
ment.29 Premature discharge of the patient by the dentist may
amount to post-operative negligence, as may the failure to take an
X-ray after an operation. The failure to reasonably sterilize and
treat a socket from which a tooth has been removed will result in
liability for the dentist if the omission causes injury to the patient.
The application of post-operative negligence is beautifully il-
lustrated in the case of Graham v. Roberts."' This case involved the
extraction of a tooth. There was no allegation of negligence ip the
extraction, but rather that "the dentist was negligent in continuing
to treat a worsening condition of pansinusitis over a period of four
months, instead of referring appellant's condition to a properly
qualified medical specialist for treatment . .. ."
To sustain a recovery in a malpractice case, the plaintiff, in
addition to proving negligence on the part of the defendant, must
establish that the proven negligence was the proximate cause of
of many cases in which the courts have considered the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine in dental cases. It should be noted that res ipsa does not apply in
malpractice cases in West Virginia. See Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366
(4th Cir. 1968); Vaughn v. Memorial Hosp., 103 W. Va. 156, 136 S.E. 837 (1927).
2Negaard v. Feda, 152 Mont. 47, 446 P.2d 436 (1968); Inglis v. Morton, 99
Wash. 570, 169 P. 962 (1918); Vale v. Noe, 172 Wis. 421, 179 N.W. 572 (1920). See
18 NACCA L.J. 352 (1956).
2Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 291 P. 173 (1930); Perkins v. Trueblood, 180
Cal. 437, 181 P. 642 (1919); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956); Donoho v.
Rawleigh, 230 Ky. 11, 18 S.W.2d 311 (1929).
2Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).2
'Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956); Donathan v. McConnell, 121
Mont. 230, 193 P.2d 819 (1948).
30441 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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the injury. Both negligence and proximate cause are questions of
fact for the jury. Once the plaintiff has introduced evidence of
sufficient weight and character, the court is warranted in submit-
ting the case to the jury for determination of factual matters." If
there is evidence of negligence and some competent testimony that
tends to establish that such negligence was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury, the case should go to the jury. The trial judge
may not rule on the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law.32
In most jurisdictions, contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff is a defense in tort cases. 3 Thus, in the states follow-
ing this rule, the dentist may show the patient's contributory negli-
gence as a defense in a malpractice action. However, if the pa-
tient's negligence does not concur with that of the dentist but is
later in time, the negligence of the patient does not constitute
contributory negligence and will not serve as a defense. It may,
however, be shown in mitigation of damages.34
Where the patient moves his head at the time a needle is
about to be inserted in his gums and the needle breaks in the gums,
the movement of the head may constitute contributory negligence.
This assumes, of course, that the dentist had been negligent in
selecting the size of the needle or the place of insertion. 35 The
patient's failure to go to an oral surgeon to have a broken needle
removed after having been advised by the treating dentist to do so
does not amount to contributory negligence on the part of the
patient, but such refusal may be shown to mitigate damages where
the patient's failure to follow the recommendation added to his
injury. It is easy to see that the patient's post-operative negligence
and contributory negligence are two entirely different things. 6
There are several possible reasons why "malpractice" or "pro-
fessional liability" actions have increased greatly in size and num-
ber in recent years. Some of the reasons suggested are:
3'Lindloff v. Ross, 208 Wis. 482, 243 N.W. 403 (1932). See Note, Medical Mal-
practice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834 (1966). See also W. MoRms,
DENTAL LITIGATION, supra note 9, at ch. 10 for other cases.
12Whetstine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 291 N.W. 425 (1940); Darling v. Semler,
145 Ore. 259, 27 P.2d 886 (1933); Friend v. Kramer, 236 Pa. 618, 85 A. 12 (1912).
3W. MORRIS, DENTAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 95 (1972).
3
'DuBois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325, 29 N.E. 313 (1891); McCracken v. Smather,
122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898).
2Alonzo v. Rogers, 155 Wash. 206, 283 P. 709 (1930).
"Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 150 A. 516 (1930); Patterson v. Howe, 102
Ore. 275, 202 P. 225 (1921).
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(1) . People are more aware of the possibility that they
may recover froin a dentist or physician. Television has
played its part in educating the pepple to this possibility.
(2) Patients now know that most professional men carry
malpractice insurance and any recovery against the phy-
sician or dentist will be paid by the insurance company.
(3) Some claimants may have been advised by unethi-
cal counsel to sue despite lack of a real basis for litigation.
(4) Actions are sometimes engendered when the physi-
cian or dentist fails to establish a proper rapport with the
patient or the patient's family. •
(5) The professional man may himself have caused mal-
practice actions by unduly criticizing the work of an-
other.
It has been said that a dentist who can say that he has never
been sued or threatened with a malpractice suit after actively prac-
ticing ten or more years is a man who has developed the fine art
of liking and getting along with people. A good relationship be-
tween the patient and the dentist is the best contraceptive to mal-
practice and professional liability cases.
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